In 2012, a U.S. Institute of Medicine report called for a different approach to health care: “Left unchanged, health care will continue to underperform; cause unnecessary harm; and strain national, state, and family budgets.” The answer, they suggested, would be a “continuously learning” health system. Ethicists and researchers urged the creation of “learning health organizations” that would integrate knowledge from patient‐care data to continuously improve the quality of care. Our experience with an ongoing research study on atrial fibrillation—a trial known (...) as IMPACT‐AFib—gave us some insight into one of the challenges that will have to be dealt with in creating these organizations. Although the proposed educational intervention study placed no restrictions on what providers and health plans could do, the oversight team argued that the ethical principle of beneficence did not allow the researchers to be “bystanders” in relation to a control group receiving suboptimal care. In response, the researchers designed a “workaround” that allowed the project to go forward. We believe the experience suggests that what we call “bystander ethics” will create challenges for the kinds of quality improvement research that LHOs are designed to do. (shrink)

In 2012, a U.S. Institute of Medicine report called for a different approach to health care: “Left unchanged, health care will continue to underperform; cause unnecessary harm; and strain national, state, and family budgets.” The answer, they suggested, would be a “continuously learning” health system. Ethicists and researchers urged the creation of “learning health organizations” that would integrate knowledge from patient‐care data to continuously improve the quality of care. Our experience with an ongoing research study on atrial fibrillation—a trial known (...) as IMPACT‐AFib—gave us some insight into one of the challenges that will have to be dealt with in creating these organizations. Although the proposed educational intervention study placed no restrictions on what providers and health plans could do, the oversight team argued that the ethical principle of beneficence did not allow the researchers to be “bystanders” in relation to a control group receiving suboptimal care. In response, the researchers designed a “workaround” that allowed the project to go forward. We believe the experience suggests that what we call “bystander ethics” will create challenges for the kinds of quality improvement research that LHOs are designed to do. (shrink)

This book shows that Hauriou's positivist and pragmatic jurisprudence and social theory, as well as their application to the study of institutions, is satisfactorily supported by his idealistic philosophy. The nine chapters first locate Hauriou's influences, then situate his disciplinary methodologies within methodology in general. The central chapters concern each of the three methodologies in turn.

This landmark collection of essays by six renowned philosophers explores the implications of the contentious realism/antirealism debate for epistemology. The essays examine issues such as whether epistemology needs to be realist, the bearing of a realist conception of truth on epistemology, and realism and antirealism in terms of a pragmatist conception of epistemic justification. Richard Rorty's essay provides a critical commentary on the other five.

In February 54b.c. Cicero concludes a missive to his brother with a passing and – for us – tantalizing remark:Lucreti poemata ut scribis ita sunt, multis luminibus ingeni, multae tamen artis. sed cum veneris. virum te putabo si Sallusti Empedoclea legeris; hominem non putabo. Quintus had, it seems, readDe rerum natura, or at least parts thereof, just before he left Rome for an undisclosed location nearby, and he shared his enthusiasm with his brotherper codicillos. Meanwhile, he was corresponding with Julius (...) Caesar, whose staff in Gaul he was about to join. When, a few months later, he was stationed with Caesar, he was involved in another literary affair, this time concerning his brother who wrote to him, inquiring about his autobiographicalDe temporibus suis:quo modo nam, mi frater, de nostris versibus Caesar? nam primum librum se legisse scripsit ad me ante, et prima sic ut neget se ne Graeca quidem meliora legisse; reliqua ad quendam locum ῥᾳθυμότερα (hoc enim utitur verbo). dic mihi verum: num aut res eum aut χαρακτὴρ non delectat?(Q.fr.2.15.5). (shrink)

This landmark collection of essays by six renowned philosophers explores the implications of the contentious realism/antirealism debate for epistemology. The essays examine issues such as whether epistemology needs to be realist, the bearing of a realist conception of truth on epistemology, and realism and antirealism in terms of a pragmatist conception of epistemic justification. Richard Rorty's essay provides a critical commentary on the other five.

This is a book on metaethics—in particular, an inquiry into the metaphysical foundations of morality. After carefully exploring the metaphysical commitments, or lack thereof, of the leading versions of moral anti-realism, Kulp develops a new and in-depth theory of moral realism. Starting with the firm recognition of the importance of our common sense belief that we possess a great deal of moral knowledge—that, for example, some acts are objectively right and some objectively wrong—the book goes on to examine the metaphysical (...) grounds of various skeptical responses to this perspective. In great part, the book is devoted to developing a version of realist metaethics: specifically, developing in detail realist theories of moral truth, moral facts, and moral properties.Concluding with the rejection of prominent contemporary forms of moral anti-realism, Kulp presents a rigorous non-naturalistic theory of moral realism, and a vindication of the basic commitments of commonsense moral thought. (shrink)

This book is staunchly anti-skeptical. It develops a theory of moral realism—there are indeed objective moral truths—and a broadly commonsense theory of moral knowledge: although we are certainly liable to error, we nevertheless often possess moral knowledge.

Søren Kierkegaard is well known for his claim that human life is marked by three existential spheres — the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious. In Bob Dylan and the Spheres of Existence, Christopher B. Barnett argues that Kierkegaard's theory provides a key interpretative lens through which to evaluate the songwriting of Bob Dylan.

Historical Dictionary of Kierkegaard's Philosophy, Second Edition chronicles the life and thoughts of the great Danish thinker Søren Kierkegaard (1813-55). What makes this volume essential is its extensive scope: it provides a glossary of concepts, persons, and places related to Kierkegaard’s authorship, from “Absolute” to “Hans Christian Ørsted.”.

A general history of technology -- Technology in golden age Denmark -- Kierkegaard on the rise of technological culture -- Kierkegaard's analysis of information technology -- From Hegel to Google: Kierkegaard and the perils of the system -- Kierkegaard and the question concerning technology.

There is not agreement among moral intuitionists on the nature of moral intuitions: some favor a doxastic interpretation, others a non-doxastic interpretation. This paper argues that although both interpretations have legitimacy, the doxastic interpretation is preferable. The paper discusses three salient roles for moral intuitions:Role 1: To serve as a test for moral theories.Role 2: To provide a particularist grounding for moral judgment.Role 3: To stop a vicious infinite regress of justified moral belief.The doxastic interpretation better serves Role 1, given (...) the greater justificatory weight rationally accorded intuitive moral beliefs over intuitive moral “seemings,” upon which we may place little if any justificatory weight: intuitive beliefs provide firmer ground for judging moral theories to be correct or incorrect, adequate or inadequate, etc., than mere seemings. The doxastic interpretation better serves Role 2, in that particularist intuitional belief warrants greater confidence in apparent moral truth than intuitive seemings; and given that moral particularists commonly allot great epistemic authority to intuitions about particular cases, this counts heavily in favor of intuitional belief. The doxastic interpretation better serves Role 3 because (i) the greater agential justificatory burdens attendant to believing that p as opposed to merely being appeared to (or its seeming) that p, warrants that a higher degree of epistemic weight be given doxastic intuitions; and (ii) they are less vulnerable to doxastic ascent-type arguments, which would undermine their basicality as justification providers. (shrink)

Quo usque tandem abutere, Catilina, patientia nostra?. The famous incipit—‘And what are you reading, Master Buddenbrook? Ah, Cicero! A difficult text, the work of a great Roman orator. Quousque tandem, Catilina. Huh-uh-hmm, yes, I've not entirely forgotten my Latin, either’— already impressed contemporaries, including some ordinarily not so readily impressed. It rings through Sallust's version of Catiline's shadowy address to his followers, when he asks regarding the injustices they suffer : quae quousque tandem patiemini, o fortissumi uiri?. More playfully, and (...) less well-known, Sallust employed the expression again in a speech by Philippus : uos autem, patres conscripti, quo usque cunctando rem publicam intutam patiemini et uerbis arma temptabitis?. Soon afterwards it served Cicero's son, who, as governor of Asia, put down Hybreas fils for having dared to quote from his father's work in his presence : ‘age’, inquit [sc. Marcus Tullius], ‘non putas me didicisse patris mei: “quousque tandem abutere, Catilina, patientia nostra”?’. Just about the same time, Livy recalled it in order to colour Manlius’ exhortation of his followers : quousque tandem ignorabitis uires uestras, quas natura ne beluas quidem ignorare uoluit? … audendum est aliquid uniuersis aut omnia singulis patienda. quousque me circumspectabitis?. Thereafter Quintilian would refer to it twice, when discussing apostrophe and rhetorical questions, just a couple of years before Tacitus has the maladroit Q. Haterius encourage Tiberius to seize the reins—quo usque patieris, Caesar, non adesse caput rei publicae? ; a few decades later still, Apuleius puts it into the mouth of the slave who chastises his master, now in asinine form : ‘quo usque tandem’, inquit, ‘cantherium patiemur istum paulo ante cibariis iumentorum, nunc etiam simulacris deorum infestum?’. He trusted, no doubt, that the famous question would alert his readers more than anything to the many ‘similarities between Catiline and Lucius’, in order to have them appreciate this ‘ludicrous copy of Cicero's arch-enemy’. Some time after, and in a different corner of the Empire altogether, a teacher's bronze statue would carry the inscription:VERBACICRO | NISQVOVSQ | TANDEMABVTE | RECATELINAPA | TIENTIANOS | TRA. (shrink)

John Dewey's philosophical work has enjoyed a resurgence of interest of late, largely because of its iconoclastic stance toward traditional philosophy in general, and traditional epistemology in particular. In this dissertation I examine critically the anti-epistemological project which occupied Dewey throughout the first half of this century. In common with many other commentators, I understand Dewey to have held that the central, fatal flaw of traditional epistemology is its commitment to what he called the Spectator Theory of Knowledge --roughly the (...) theory that the metaphor of vision has functioned as the primary model in the characterization of knowing: that knowing is most fundamentally a passive, "beholding" relation beween the knower and the object known. After specifying precisely what Dewey takes STK to be and illustrating how traditional epistemology is, on Dewey's view, essentially committed to it, I rationally reconstruct and then explicate the main lines of criticism of STK developed by Dewey over the course of some fifty years, and examine these criticisms to ascertain whether they show that STK, hence traditional epistemology, is indefensible. The general conclusion reached is that although Dewey achieves partial success against one version of STK, he utterly fails to defeat another version of the theory; and hence, that his overall anti-epistemological project is unsuccessful. (shrink)

Kulp provides a thorough examination of John Dewey's influential arguments against traditional theories of knowledge; in particular against the thesis that knowing is fundamentally a passive "beholding" relation between the knower and the object known and ultimately, he finds them deficient. He also lays the basis for a defense of a spectator theory of having knowledge, a basis that incorporates important considerations about introspective knowledge.

Commentators agree that Kierkegaard's “second authorship” emphasizes the imitatio Christi. But they disagree in their understanding of conforming one's life to Christ. Does the authorship end with a summons to martyrdom or with heightened love of the neighbor? The paper argues that Kierkegaard's appropriation of the imitatio theme in pietist literature shows that human limitation and divine supremacy are the hallmarks of imitating Christ. Both potential martyrdom and the practice of the love of the neighbor rest upon submission to God (...) and reliance upon divine grace. (shrink)

Discussing different types of metaphor, Isidore of Seville quotes an anonymous fragment that uses agricultural vocabulary to describe the sailing of a ship in order to illustratemetaphorae ab inanimali ad inanimale‘metaphors taken from inanimate objects and applied to inanimate objects’ (Etym.1.37.3 = inc. fr. 63 Blänsdorf):1.

Fishers of Fish and Fishers of Men: Fishing Imagery in the Hebrew Bible and the Ancient Near East. By Tyler R. Yoder. Explorations in Ancient Near Eastern Civilizations, vol. 4. Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2016. Pp. xviii + 222, illus. $54.50.

"By comparing the Epistle section by section with relevant passages from the Gospels, the author demonstrates the contiinuity of Paul's preaching with the teaching of Christ during his jministry, and releases for the reader the power of the Spirit which is pent up in the apostle's carefully chosen words. The "Reflections" add up to a complete commentary on the Epistle. But this is more than a commentary: it places the Epistle immediately at the service of the preacher and teacher. The (...) reader is not left to make for himself the (often difficult) transition from the deskk to pulpit." - back cover. (shrink)

The so‐called “Kierkegaard Renaissance,” which took place in Germany during the interwar period, was not merely the province of figures such as Karl Barth and Martin Heidegger. A number of Catholic thinkers were involved as well. Indeed, after the well‐known Kierkegaard scholar Theodor Haecker converted to Catholicism in 1921, Kierkegaard's thought became a popular topic among the group of Catholic intellectuals known as the Hochland Circle, which included the priest and author Romano Guardini. Such interest, in turn, prompted French theologian (...) Yves Congar to explore the use of Kierkegaard for the renewal of the modern church. Moreover, a trio of notable Jesuit thinkers also entered the discussion: Erich Przywara, Henri de Lubac, and Hans Urs von Balthasar. In short, as this chapter will demonstrate, Kierkegaard inspired and provoked Catholic thinkers in a variety of areas, from theological anthropology and Christology to ecclesiology and the question of modernity. (shrink)